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we and other aid donors are now
adapting our aid policies to give more
help to the poorest countries and the
poorest people within these countr:es
Suitably Modest
Charles Elliott
The main proposals of this White Paper are well
known, at least in broad outline, to most develop-
ment specialists. Taken as a whole they constitute
the most determined and far-reaching attempt to
change the direction, composition and nature of
British aid since the days of Andrew Cohen and
the DTC. They stem not only from Judith Hart's
political leadership but more fundamentally from
the professional concern of the last six years for
the alleged failure of development in general and
aid in particular to raise the level of living of
the poorest of the poor.
The White Paper is suitably modestsome may
think exaggeratedly soabout how much aid
donors can in fact do to ensure that benefits
accrue permanently to the poorest. Depending
upon where one stands in the "Culture of
Poverty" debate, one will recognise in that
modesty either an acknowledgment of the struc-
tural factors that consistently reinforce the
poverty of the poor or a more 'vulgar' realisa-
tion that no aid programme can prevent the
switching of domestic resources or plug the gap
between propaganda and reality. It would be a
rash or optimistic reader who chose the first
interpretation, for there is little evidence in the
rest of the document that the structures and
mechanisms of the reinforcement of poverty have
yet been much recognised in 0DM. While it
would be unfair to attribute to the White Paper's
authors the same kind of 'resource aggregation'
naIvete that marked much early (and current)
World Bank 'poverty planning' (ghastly phrase),
it is nonetheless true that the analysis of the
causes of poverty implicit (and only occasionally
explicit) in the White Paper veers nearer to the
'shortage of resources' end of the ideological
spectrum than the 'exploitative relationships' end.
To expect otherwise would no doubt be fanciful.
It is nonetheless disappointing that, even within
its own circumscribed ideological limits, the
White Paper shows a bureaucratic rigidity that
bodes ill for the rapid or thoroughgoing imple-
mentation of the new policy. Consider this para-
graph on the crucial issue of local costsan
issue, incidentally, that has been consistently
hammered in the poverty-aid literature and by
the Select Committee on Overseas Development
in at least two Reports to the House of
Commons:
We are ready to consider allowing in excep-
tional cases a limited part of our financial aid
to meet local costs of individual projects. We
take account of a number of factors. The most
important is the development case. This will in
turn depend on such things as the availability
to the recipient country of domestic resources
and free foreign exchange, and the efforts made
to improve the mobilisation of those resources.
What, one wonders, will turn out to be an 'ex-
ceptional case'? And why does it need to be ex-
ceptional anyway? If the arguments turn out to
be the tired trio of the British balance of pay-
ments, local commitment to the projects as mani-
fested by the mobilisation of domestic resources
and the avoidance of recurrent commitments, we
need to treat the new orientation of the aid pro-
gramme with, at least, considerable reserve.
There are two further reasons for gentle sceptic-
ism. The first is the hoary issue of absorptive
capacity. Of course the White Paper recognises
this and promises "more technical assistance to
identify, formulate and implement projects and
programmes" (p.10). At worst, this could be an
invitation to World Bankish insensitivity, with
expatriate experts 'identifying' the needs,
priorities and aspirations of deprived people, with
never a thought given to involving them in the
slow, frustrating and sometimes conflict-laden
business of deciding their own preferences and
requirements. This is not necessarily to argue
that only 'bottom-up' programmes can have an
immediate and lasting impact on poverty; it is
to suggest that under pressure to make the new
policy stick, aid officials can all too easily ignore
the lessons that social (if not economic) planners
are beginning to learn from 20 years of dis-
appointment.
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The second reason for gentle scepticism is that
it is one thing to produce a White Paper which
makes all (or at least some) of the right noises;
it is quite another to make that policy stick. One
wonders how the Minister views aid to Greece
and Portugal in a post-White Paper era? True,
there are very poor people in those countries, but
that is the nub. By directing its priorities to the
poorest countries (and those among them with the
worst growth prospects), the White Paper opts
out of the relative/absolute poverty debate al-
together. For it assumes that poverty is defined
by scarcity rather than by inequality. True, it
can be argued that as far as aid is concerned, this
is the only definition that makes operational
sense. The reader must judge for himself whether
that is a valid argument. If it is, this White Paper
is not only on aid to poverty: it is on the poverty
of aid.
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. more should be done to ensure that
a higher proportion of British aid should
directly benefit not only the poorest
countries but the poorest people in those
countries
Policies for the Poor and Hungry
T. W. Gee
The international economic analysis in the
ODM's second White Paper The work in hand
(Cmnd. 3180-1967) concluded with a prophetic
sentence. Many developing countries, it suggested,
especially producers of petroleum or metal ores,
would continue to receive sufficient foreign ex-
change, but an increasing number were likely
to find their growth rate constrained by shortage
of it.
The third White Paper More Help for rie
Poorest (Cmnd. 6270-1975) identifies the sharp
oil price rise as critical for developing countries,
with many now concerned with survival rather
than development, because of serious deteriora-
tion in their terms of trade.
There is little else which spans the eight year gap
between these two White Papers. Cmnd. 3180
was written in days of hope at the beginning of
the Second Development Decade and echoes
memories of the closing period of colonial rule.
It opened with a cautiously optimistic global
view of growth in production (and people). It
was written when 0DM was excited with
problem-solving and fired by the leadership,
commitment, and enthusiasm of Andrew Cohen
(who died in the following year).
Today there is a more sombre mood. The open-
ing summary paragraph of the 1976 Select Com-
mittee Report on Overseas Development on the
world food crisis states that if the changes pro-
posed are not put into effect by all donors,
millions more people throughout the world will
die. The expert evidence in the ensuing 400 pages
reveals that the task of feeding the world's people
is truly formidable.
There has been change in another respect, too.
Today, opportunities for effective direct inter-
vention by Britain are much fewer, particularly
in the key rural areas, and the number of
Britishers directly employed by overseas govern-
ments, universities, and other institutions con-
tinues to decline. As Julius Nyerere realised early
in the last decade, the impetus for development
must come from within. The Permanent Secretary
told the Select Committee, in the context of
directing aid to the poorest people, of today's
need to work within the commitments and plans
of recipient countries, and that nothing could be
done where they lacked the political will or
capacity to act. Accusations of unwarranted
interference in internal matters are understand-
able, when the critical issues are redistribution of
income and unemployment. Informed comment
on such questions embarrasses political leaders,
particularly when it draws attention to the widen-
ing gulf between the urban elites and rural
peasants, and policies which import inappropriate
Western industrial technologies. The increasing
demand for a fundamental restructuring of inter-
national trade has attractions as an alternative
method for redistribution between nations, but
as with aid for the poorest, internal policies
determine the haves and the have-nots, and
whether any increase in prices of primary pro-
ducts actually benefit the producers.
More Help for the Poorest recognises all these
limits imposed on donors that want to expand
rural development programmes. The wishes of
recipients must be respected and so must their
sensitivity to prescriptive advice on policy matters
at the heart of the internal political process in all
countries. Increasingly, acceptable expertise must
be limited to the provision of know-how, and
technique. This becomes the donor's dilemma-
how to offer but not to prescribe the right
medicine: to make available what is best for the
recipient, to be sure that it is his choice and that
he chooses right. Providing more aid to the
poorest is neatly summed up in Cmnd. 3180 as
"easier said than done". The hope seems to be
that consultation, conferences and discussion will
lead to successful cooperation between donor and
recipient in choosing the right projects, but can
this hope be fulfilled in respect of policies that
seek to penetrate such sensitive areas? There are
attractions in using voluntary and multi-lateral
channels for these new programmes, but inter-
national experts tend to be anodyne, bureaucratic,
expensive, and remote (and oddly inappropriate
figures to handle poverty-focused planning).
The doubts raised by the White Paper lead one
to speculate about what can and should be done
to help one another in a world of many new
nations asserting their independence. The con-
cluding chapter of Cmnd. 6270 pays lip service to
the need to make some reference to trade policies
('incomplete without some mention'). This raises
a wide set of issues not tackled in ODM's de-
partmental White Paper on Aid and effectively
postponed once again in Britain's recent 'talk
about talks' at UNCTAD IV. Another longer run
concern is the fundamental question of educating
our own people in Britain to think internation-
ally, because the way we set about this process
must be a determinant of Britain's future role in
the Government has decided, that
there should be an increasing emphasis
on aid to the poorest countries
the world and whether we shall continue to be
influential in the new situation now taking shape
in the remaining part of this century. Trade, and
development education, (and overseas tuition
fees?) are examples of areas where we can act to
promote the ends with which the White Paper is
concerned without facing the difficulties of aid
programmes; they can be settled 'in our own
front yard'. Departmentalism in Whitehall pre-
vents their being seen in that context.
In the third quarter of this century the world has
shifted from an era of imperial dependency to-
wards one characterised by strong nationalistic
independence. Hopefully in this last quarter we
shall explore areas of mutual cooperationof
international interdependencewhere north and
south can work together. The technology to
eliminate poverty exists and we must together put
it into use. This is the challenge now before us,
identified by the latest White Paper.
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the character of the political, social
arid economic power structure in each
country conditions the power of govern-
ments to ensure a more equitable distri-
bution of the benefits of growth
New Directions?
Ashok Mitra
The mythology of external aid is one of variegated
splendour. Leave out at one end the fire-brand
radical who would not touch foreign money with
the lengthiest barge pole, and at the other the
true-blue colonialist who still awaits, in the
manner of Seventh Day Adventists, for the
second coming of a Robert Clive or a Gordon
Pasha. The spectrum in between would still cover
theists of innumerable descriptions. Amongst the
recipients, there are those who regard external
assistance as a prerogativean expiation on the
part of the imperialist scoundrels for all the ex-
ploitation they had indulged in in the course of
the past three centuries. There are the 'structural-
ists', who rationalize aid as compensation for
unjust injuries inflicted by shifts in terms-of-trade.
Yet others accept it, without flinching, as hush
money, or demand it as straightforward black-
mail. On the side of donors are those who are
bent on saving the world from the clutches of a
heathen ideology, others who want the world
power balance to be modestly tilted on their side,
or those who are keen to ensure the demand for
their (often obsolete and over-priced) goods and
services by dangling aid funds and thus kill two
birds with one stone. In the final category are the
wide array of liberals, econometricians and
Quakers not excluding, who genuinely believe in
the proposition that global welfare can be added
to if, at the margin, some resources are trans-
ferred from the relatively rich to the relatively
poor nations.
Not surprisingly, what has emerged as a practis-
ing art in the post-World War II period is a
hotchpotch. As the international political climate
has changed, so have nuances in the craft of aid-
giving-cum-receiving. But for each government-
and international organization its particularised
myth has constituted the staple of public rela-
tions: we are offering (accepting) aid to further
this or that noble objective. The reality under-
lying the myth has been, in nearly all cases, sub-
stantially different. National self-interest has ruled
supreme. Even the jingoes in the developing
world, who elevate foreign assistance to the level
of a moral right, have no way of enforcing their
claim: if the United States, for instance, refuses
to cough up, they cannot invade that country with
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their armed forces, or threaten it with nuclear
annihilation. A government has decided to dole
out credit or grants to another government pretty
much in the manner it has felt would maximise
its interests; it has, on its own, decided upon the
quantity to be disbursed as also the countries
where the aid ought to flow. Occasional preach-
ing on the part of international bodies has had
little impact, if any at all, on the magnitude and
pattern of assistance: it is only when what an out-
side agency suggested coincided with a govern-
ment's own predilections that there has been a
convergence of international preaching and
national practice. If Salvador Allende failed to
obtain any funds from the United States, it was
not just because the World Bank too was not
disbursing any money to him; the US had its own
reasons, and perhaps, given the weightage
exercised by that nation, the causality was the
other way round. Similarly, if the floodgates of
American munificence are now threatening to
overwhelm Admiral Pinochet's regime, and the
World Bank too is discovering reasons why Chile
has once more become 'bankable', the underly-
ing factors have nothing to do with any consistent,
symmetrical philosophy of philanthropy; those
who decide to give money to others do so for
their own reasons. As Mae West once indicated
in a slightly different context: intrinsic goodness
has nothing to do with it.
It is equally necessary to dispel certain other
notions in this area. The Ministry of Overseas
Development's latest White Paper on foreign aid
reads very well; for undergraduate students called
upon to prepare tutorial essays on the shifting
cultural norms affecting external assistance, this
would prove to be an excellent primer. The docu-
ment is frightfully à la mode. The United Nations
has wakened up to the fact in the decade of the
l970s that, amongst its members, some are 'the
least developed'; Robert McNamara in the World
Bank has stumbled upon the parallel fact that, in
developing countries as elsewhere, there is such
a phenomenon as incomes being unequally dis-
tributed between groups and sections. It is never
polite to ask too many questions; why this belated
acquisition of knowledge should therefore remain
beyond the realm of speculation. The poor having
been discovered, the call has gone out: hence-
forth, the emphasis in policy should be on the
uplift of the most deprived within each nation.
Individual governments too have taken up the
cue: slogans, howsoever full-throated, break no
bones. As far as international organizations and
foreign governments are concerned, there is no
reason to think that they are anything but well-
meaning. Besides, some of these external agencies
may be displaying a species of perspicacity in
urging national governments to concentrate on
the problems of the poorest, for, in case nothing
gets done, a bloody revolution could well be round
the corner. Such revolutions may change the
global balance of power in a way which may not
be relished by a body such as the World Bank, so
it may not be all altruism. Nonetheless, there may
also be an honest core of compassion for the
poorest.
The British government White Paper toes this
benevolent line. Echoing recent UN and World
Bank documents, it refers to the fact that efforts
over the past quarter of a century notwithstand-
ing many developing nations continue to be
afflicted by a chronic set of problems: large-scale
unemployment and under-employment, rapid
growth of population, lagging food supply, and
increasing polarization between a small, affluent
sector and the overwhelming majority condemned
to remain at the barest level of living. The recent
energy crisis, in addition, has blighted the growth
prospects of many of these countries. Accord-
ingly, the broad strategy of British development
aid is seen as consisting of (a) an increasing
stress on providing aid to the poorest countries,
particularly those 'most seriously affected by the
rise in the price of oil and other commodities', and
(b) programmes 'orientated towards the poorest
groups within these countries, and especially to
rural development'. Different chapters in the White
Paper explain how this two-pronged strategy
is going to be worked out. Countries with per
capita annual incomes of less than $200 are
designated as the poorest; it is mentioned that,
since mid-1975, aid commitments to these
countries are being made on a straightforward
grant basis. It would be possible to accord the
most effective help, the White Paper implies, 'to
those governments which see the need for, and are
trying to implement, policies and programmes
directly affecting poverty, employment and income
distribution'. Since most of the poorest in the
least developed countries are concentrated in rural
areas, mention is made of the desirability of an
integrated approach 'with attention paid to such
matters as rural roads, water control, credit
facilities, marketing machinery, elementary educa-
tion and rural health facilities'. The broad frame-
work of policy thus laid down, other chapters
refer to detailed issues pertaining to housing,
urban development, population control (with a
full-fledged recognition of the new wisdom that
population aid is not merely a matter of
family planning programmes, since a rise in living
standards appears to be a necessary pre-requisite'),
emergency assistance for food, fertilizer and
disaster relief, etc. The rest of the chapters, deal-
ing mostly with the problem of co-ordination with
international bodies, support the by-now standard
quasi-liberal prescriptions, such as support for
the World Bank's 'third window' and the IMF's
Oil Facility; there is also reference to the need of
persuading the oil-rich countries to do more for
the poorest nations. The intent to co-operate with
the UN and its specialised agencies is reiterated,
the Lomé convention is hailed, an oblique point
is made that perhaps the EEC could do a little
bit more 'for the most populous and poorest
states in the developing world' Finally, there is
mention of the on-going trade and commodity
control negotiations which should take account of
the needs of the poorest developing country
producers'. Predictably, the British initiative at
Kingston on the commodities question receives
laudatory reference.
In short, all the proper noises, all the proper
nuances, nobody can fault this document on the
ground that it fails to keep up with the develop-
mental assistance Joneses. The basic issue is how-
ever not even touched upon. The document pro-
ceeds on the presumption that foreign donors are
at liberty to choose those upon whom to bequeath
their favours within a developing country. There
is a certain apparent innocence in the way pres-
criptions are doled out: we, the outsiders, resolve
unto ourselves that, from now on, when we go
out to a poor land, we will assist only the most
wretched ones, we will concentrate on providing
basic education, health facilities, credit, etc., for
the latter, we will tell the government of the
country to make the necessary ancillary arrange-
ments so that this decision of ours could be
efficiently implemented. But these governments
in the recipient nations are sovereign entities; they
may not do your bidding.
Just as no poor nation can hope to extract
specified quantities of assistance from this or
that rich nation for this or that purpose merely
by asking, similarly no would-be donor nation is
in a position to insist, or ensure, that the aid she
is providing is to be earmarked for this or that
group. This is not, you know, how it is done in the
real world. In each developing land, the poorest
have reached their present plight because the
decks have been consistently loaded against them
by the ruling groups. It is not unnatural for the
entrenched elements to take care that the distribu-
tion of income and assets remains skewed in
favour of themselvesand their near and dear
onesin the countryside as well as in the urban
areas, whatever the current fashion in aid-giving.
Provided they are not particularly worried about
either the lessons of history or the occasional
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forebodings of a Robert McNamara (particularly
a McNan-iara presumably recovering from the
trauma of Vietnam), they will feel scarcely
enthusiastic towards exotic programmes for
ameliorating the conditions of the poorest. The
ruling groups may seemingly go along with pro-
jects which, on the face of it, intend to shower
benefits on the most deprived and exploited ones,
and receive resources from abroad on the basis of
an implicit commitment to spend them on such
projects. But what they do with the money re-
mains basically their own business. The practice
of end-use inspection for bilateral aid is, for all
practical purposes, a non-starter; there are sensi-
tive issues of sovereignty involved; apart from
some police exchange of pious wishes, a donor
government can do little to ensure that the funds
do in fact reach those for whom they were
intended in the first place. This would be
especially so in respect of rural projects: a
foreigner, barging in to discover for himself
whether the funds are going to the right people
or are being siphoned off by the minister's son-in-
law or the ruling party's local henchmen, will be
in danger of receiving short shrift. And realpolitik
being what it is, few foreign governments would
have the courage to cut off priorly committed
aid to a country on the ground that the poorest
are not benefiting from it.
There is, besides, that other essential truth which
holds in all seasons: more often than not, the
marginal unit of external assistance finances not
the economically most sensible or the socially
most desirable project, but the one which was at
the top of the government's own waiting list.
This is a fact of life which no amount of well-
intentioned essay-writing can unsettle.
Ring-a-ring-a-roses, a pocketful of poses. But,
whatever the current jargon of obfuscation,
aid-receiving between nations would always be a
matter of optimisation of mutual interests of the
governments involved; serving the cause of the
poorsorry, the pooresthas per se nothing to
do with it. So please don't be surprised if, despite
this White Paper, at the end of another decade,
the net impact of British assistance, original in-
tentions notwithstanding, is adjudged to having
contributed to a further aggravation of social and
economic inequalities in India, Kenya or the
Bahamas.
. . There is an important difference
between concentrating on increased
agricultural production per se and in-
creased agricultural production through
the medium of rural development. The
latter should involve an improvement of
the standard of life of the rural popula-
tion
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. projects and programmes should be
designed to ensure as far as possible that
the employment and incomes of the
poorest groups grow at an acceptable
rate without undue sacrifice in the growth
of production
What is Said and What Left Unsaid
Robert Gassen
If the International Monetary Fund were to
stipulate that future loans to the United Kingdom
should be used as far as possible to mitigate
poverty in Britain, the intelligent British citizen
would be surprised and somewhat irritated: sur-
prised because that's not the sort of policy we
expect from the IMF; and irritated becausewell,
who are they to tell us what to do? The new
White Paper on aid goes out of its way to respect
the sensitivities of potential recipient governments;
but members of these governments, whatever they
may say in public, might well express irritation
in private at some of these 'new emphases'. (Pre-
sumably no government of a poor country would
say in public that the eradication of poverty was
not a high priority.) My assessment of the new
emphases starts from a view of the motives for aid
giving: without the political and commercial
interest of the aid 'donors', there would be no
aid to speak ofbut without the altruistic motives
of much of the public opinion which supports
aid, the volume of it would be much smaller than
it is. Many people (myself included) wish to see
the mitigation of poverty not because there will
otherwise be revolutions or troubles that threaten
our own way of life, but because poverty is
obnoxious in itself, and the desirability of its
removal one of the nearest things to a moral cer-
tainty that we know of in a morally perplexing
world. That aid can contribute to the mitigation
of poverty I have less doubts about than its many
critics of the right and the left (Ashok Mitra
included). My difficulty with the White Paper is
that, because it stems from the Ministry of Over-
seas Development, it almost of necessity stops
you from perceiving the murk of many British
policiesor lack of policiestowards the Third
World because of the dazzling light of its own
virtue.
Since aid is going to continue, it seems a good
thing to me that these new emphases are penetrat-
ing Whitehall. It seems right that aid should go
mainly to those who most need it, provided that
they will use it well. It also seems right that aid
should be directed towards the most poverty-
afflicted sections of the populations of recipient
countries, insofar as it can be. The actual changes
in Britain's aid programme that will result from
the rethinking of policy will in fact be very
modest and very slow. A high proportion of our
aid already goes to the poorest countries (70 per
cent of new commitments in 1974), and 'various
considerations will require the continuance of
some aid flows to not-quite-so-poor countries.
When it comes to poverty within countries, the
main instrument of policy is more aid for rural
development: but all the White Paper actually
suggests doing about that is regrouping its staff
into a new Rural Development Department, and
trying harder to promote requests for appropriate
rural projects.
This latter issue is a weak point in the White
Paper, to my mind. It may be hard to 'do more'
in the rural development field. But it does not
follow from the fact that x is of high priority, that
more aid should flow into x. Britain has little
comparative advantage in fostering employment-
oriented rural projects. Highly capital-intensive
plants for producing agricultural chemicals,
which we can construct relatively well, may be a
much better use for British aid. They may, in-
directly, even generate more employment for the
money spent. Such expertise as we have in directly
employment-creating rural schemes should be used
to help those countries that need it with demons-
tration projects. In general, the principle should
surely be to use aid resources to complement those
of countries which have well designed and
reasonable programmes of rural development,
whatever the aid is actually spent on. It should
be specifically aimed at direct rural employment
creation mainly where that is not the case. (There
is the further problem too that rural employment-
oriented schemes are likely to be relatively slow-
disbursing; for several developing countries the
requirement from the balance-of-payments point
of view is much more to maintain a high rate of
aid disbursements than to 'improve' the sectoral
mix of aid use.)
On various other subjects what the White Paper
has to say is more congenial. In fields such as
health, urban development and housing, or educa-
tion, aid has often supported investments that
have actually fostered inequality. The recognition
that this has been so, and attempts to avoid it in
future, are surely welcome. As Florence
Nightingale once said, the least you can ask of a
hospital is that it "do the sick no harm". 1f, as
Ashok Mitra suggests in his review, British aid
does 'do harm' and contribute to an aggravation
of inequality, it will either be because it has freed
resources for investments which do have such
effects, or because in general it supports govern-
ments whose policies tend that way. This is
asking us to believe that without British aid,
the governments of those countries will behave
better, or be replaced by others that do so-
an act of faith which I cannot share. I really
think one must distinguish British from American
aid policies, whose naked support of despicable
governments, or disruption of relatively benign
ones, has given aid a bad name. Britain
abstainedand should have voted Noin the
World Bank's recent decision to make a loan
to Pinochet's Chile. But one can be sure that
all the pressure to push this loan through came
from the US Government. It was pressure which
the World Bank should have resisted, even at the
cost of displeasing Mr. Kissingerit cannot fail
to darken the Bank's reputation.
My real apprehensions about the White Paper,
however, concern what it leaves out rather than
what it says. Concentrating on aid, it gives a mis-
leading picture of Britain's role in relation to the
Third World in general. While I believe British aid
is on the whole valuable to its recipients, in the
totality of activities that affect Third World
prosperityor povertyit bulks rather small. I do
not mean just that the gross volume of aid has to
be deflated first to its grant element (quite high in
fact for current British aid) and then again by the
costs of its other conditionstying and so forth.
Rather, that the role of Britain and British cor-
porations in trade arrangements, international
monetary reform, or private investment overseas is
far more important than aid. One should not
exaggerate: even in these fields Britain has a
rather better record than many rich country
governments; one of the functions of the Ministry
of Overseas Development is to represent the
interests of the Third World in Whitehall, and it
does so with some success. It is doubtful, for
example, that other EEC governments would have
striven to give the Lomé Convention such posi-
tive features as it possesses without British initia-
tives, which owed a great deal to 0DM and to
Mrs. Hart in particular. British administrations
have to cope with a more vocal Third World
lobby than can be found in some other rich
countries, and it frequently makes itself felt.
But look at what is missing from the White
Paper: not a mention of multinational corpora-
tions, and the numerous ways research has shown
them to benefit this country at the expense of the
Third World. One would have thought there was
beginning to be enough concern about the damage
MNCs can do to the British economy to give
them a place in ODM's thinking. There is quite
a lot in the White Paper about new initiatives
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HMG has proposed or supported in the trade or
monetary fields; but silence about all the things it
has not supported, or where its support has been
lukewarm. Those occasionsnumerous occasions
when the British delegation did not insist on
holding up international business in which Third
World interests were at stake; those speeches
saying 'much as we welcome this proposal in
principle, the British government is not able to
commit itself to supporting it in the immediate
present; our own economic situation . . .' I would
like to see a White Paper on 'Britain's Economic
Relations with the Third World', written jointly
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the
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Department of Trade and Industry, and the
Treasury. But I fear that if it were as frank as
the truth demands, it would never be released for
publication. As it is, the workings of British
politics force us into all manner of unseemly
compromises, the dictates of Anglo-American
relations, the necessity of trade with South Africa.
British interests! Perhaps we should regard it as
a small victory for our better selves that there
is an aid programme as well-intentioned as the
one we have. But why didn't we oppose the
World Bank's loan to Chile? I think we know
why.
